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1.1. Nyåya sËtras 2.1.8-11 raise an objection against the earlier claim (1.1.3) that 
perception (pratyak∑a), inference (anumåna), comparison (upamåna) and testimony 
(ßabda) are means of knowledge (pramåˆa). They read: 
 
2.1.8: pratyak∑åd¥nåm apråmåˆyaµ traikålyåsiddhe˙ 
 “Perception etc. are no means of knowledge, since the three times (past, 
present and future) do not exist.” 
2.1.9: pËrvaµ hi pramåˆasiddhau nendriyårthasaµnikar∑åt pratyak∑otpatti˙ 
 “For if the means of knowledge were to exist before [its object], 
perception would not arise from the contact of sense-organ and object (as 
required by sËtra 1.1.4).” 
2.1.10: paßcåt siddhau na pramåˆebhya˙ prameyasiddhi˙ 
 “In case [the means of knowledge] were to exist after [its object], the 
object would not be known by virtue of the means of knowledge.” 
2.1.11: yugapat siddhau pratyarthaniyatatvåt kramav®ttitvåbhåvo buddh¥nåm 
 “In case [both] were to exist simultaneously, mental acts would not 
occur in sequence (as required by sËtra 1.1.16), since they would be tied 
to their respective objects.” 
 
The precise meaning of these sËtras is not immediately obvious. Våcaspati, and 
following him most investigators, ascribe the objection contained in this passage to a 
Mådhyamika. It is true that sËtra 2.1.10 can be interpreted in a way that reminds us of 
the arguments used by Någårjuna, the first and most important Mådhyamika. It seems 
typical of his style to point out that [108] a known object (prameya) cannot exist 
without a means of knowledge (pramåˆa). But it is hard to see why a Mådhyamika 
should say that mental acts would not occur in sequence in case objects and means of 
knowledge were to exist simultaneously, as he seems to say in sËtra 2.1.11. 
 This last sËtra, 2.1.11, gives us the clue to a correct understanding of the set. If we 
assume that both the means of knowledge and their objects are of a mental nature — are 
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mental acts (buddhi) — then the simultaneous existence of these two cannot but violate 
the rule that mental acts occur in sequence, the reason being that the (by assumption) 
simultaneous objects and means of knowledge are ‘tied together’ (pratyarthaniyatatvåt). 
 The main reason to think that this interpretation must be the correct one is that our 
set of sËtras now come to deal with a problem that had been extensively discussed 
elsewhere, and there too in the context of the question regarding the existence of the 
three times. Sarvåstivåda was a school of Buddhism which considered the existence of 
all the three times — past, present and future — a point of such importance that it 
derived its name therefrom: sarvam asti means ‘everything exists’. The main argument 
used by the Sarvåstivådins in order to establish their central tenet was precisely this, 
that two mental acts cannot exist simultaneously (they shared this point of view with 
Nyåya sËtra 1.1.16); since mental states can be observed, and observation of something 
non-existent is unacceptable, the conclusion was drawn that also past and future objects 
exist. 
 This argument is found in the first chapter (skandhaka) of the Vijñånakåya, a 
canonical Abhidharma work of the Sarvåstivådins ascribed to Devaßarman (or 
Devak∑ema; see Takakusu, 1905: opp. pp. 74-75, n. 4) which has been preserved in the 
Chinese translation of Xuanzang made in 649 A.D. (T. 1539).1 I shall present, in 
English translation, the first portion of this chapter (pp. 531a24-b16), in order to show 
that the argument of Nyåya sËtras 2.1.8-11 can clearly be recognized, in spite of the 
difference in wording: 
 
The monk (ßramaˆa) Maudgalyåyana says: ‘The past and the future do not exist; 
the present and the unconditioned (asaµsk®ta) exist.’ 
 One must ask him: ‘Yes or no; has it been well said by the most venerable 
one in the SËtra, well told, well spoken, that there are three roots of evil: the root 
of evil which is attachment, the root of evil which is hatred, and the root of evil 
which is delusion?’ 
[109] 
 He replies: ‘Yes.’ 
 One asks him again: ‘Yes or no; are there people who have seen, see now, 
or will see that the root of evil which is attachment is evil?’ 
 He replies: ‘Yes.’ 
 ‘Is the object of vision past, future, or present?’ 
                                                
1 The first two chapters of this work have been translated into French by La Vallée Poussin (1925). 
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 If he says that [such people] see the past, he must also admit that the past 
exists. He cannot say that the past does not exist. It would not be proper to 
maintain that the past does not exist. 
 If he says that [such people] see the future, he must also admit that the 
future exists. He cannot say that the future does not exist. It would not be proper 
to maintain that the future does not exist. 
 If he says that [such people] see the present, he must also admit that in one 
person (pudgala) simultaneously two mental acts occur together: the one which 
is seen, and the one which sees. As a result he cannot say that [such people] see 
the present. It would not be proper to maintain that [such people] see the 
present. 
 If he says that [such people] do not see the past or the future or the present, 
then there are no people who have seen, see now, or will see that the root of evil 
which is attachment is evil. If there are no people who see this, then there are no 
people who have become disgusted, are now disgusted, or will be disgusted. If 
there are no people who are disgusted, then there are no people who have 
become detached, become now detached, or will be detached. If there are no 
detached people, there are no people who have become liberated, become now 
liberated, or will become liberated. If there are no liberated people, there are no 
people who have reached Parinirvåˆa, reach now Parinirvåˆa, or will reach 
Parinirvåˆa. 
 
The same argument is repeated over and over again in but slightly differing words 
throughout the first chapter of the Vijñånakåya. 
 We see that on this interpretation of Nyåya sËtras 2.1.8-11, sËtra 10 does not have 
to be interpreted in a Madhyamaka way. It now allows of the similar explanation 
according to which all objects, including mental acts, can only be known with the help 
of means of knowledge. 
[110] 
1.2. The objection embodied in sËtras 2.1.8-11 is answered in sËtras 12-16, as follows: 
 
2.1.12: traikålyåsiddhe˙ prati∑edhånupapatti˙ 
 “The rejection [of perception etc. as means of knowledge] is not valid, 
because the non-existence of the three times [which you use as 
argument, undermines your own position].” 
2.1.13: sarvapramåˆaprati∑edhåc ca prati∑edhånupapatti˙ 
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 “The rejection is also not valid since you reject all means of knowledge. 
(How then would you know the correctness of your rejection?)” 
2.1.14: tatpråmåˆye vå na sarvapramåˆaviprati∑edha˙ 
 “Or, if that [rejection] has validity (pråmåˆya), there [can] not be 
rejection of all means of knowledge (pramåˆa).” 
2.1.15: traikålyåprati∑edhaß ca ßabdåd åtodyasiddhivat tatsiddhe˙ 
 “Moreover, the rejection of [the existence] of the three times is not 
[possible], since their [existence] is proved in the same way as [the 
existence] of a drum is proved on the basis of its sound.” 
2.1.16: prameyatå ca tulåpråmåˆyavat 
 “And [the mental acts which are the objects of other mental acts can be] 
objects of knowledge, just as a balance [which is primarily an object of 
knowledge] can be a means of knowledge (viz., when weighing things).” 
 
Only the last two of these sËtras need closer attention. SËtra 15 accepts the existence of 
the three times, as does sËtra 5.1.19.2 The Nyåya sËtras represent for this reason a point 
of view which is closely connected with that of the Sarvåstivådins, at least in this 
respect. 
[111] 
 SËtra 16 has traditionally been read with the following sËtras (2.1.17-18), which 
raise another objection against the possibility of the existence of means of knowledge. 
SËtra 16 then answers an objection before it has been raised,3 an obvious weakness of 
this interpretation. However, our new understanding of sËtras 8-11 allows us to look 
upon sËtra 16 as connected with the preceding set. Mental acts have as a rule objects, 
and are then means of knowledge. In the present context mental acts are discussed 
which are themselves objects of knowledge (prameya). How can this be explained? 
SËtra 16 gives the answer: mental acts, though primarily pramåˆa, can also be 
prameya,4 just as a balance, though primarily prameya, can also be pramåˆa. 
 Since now sËtra 16 has been apportioned to the sËtras preceding it, the following 
sËtras 17-19 can be interpreted as an independent set. They read: 
 
                                                
2 Ruben (1928: 195 n. 165) suggests that sËtra 2.1.15 is a later addition. The agreement with sËtra 5.1.19 
makes this unlikely. 
3 This does not seem to be the case anywhere else in the Nyåya sËtras; see however note 10 (???) below. 
4 All this agrees with the sËtras of Nyåya SËtra 1.1: pratyak∑a is jñåna (1.1.4); its object is in the cases 
under discussion also jñåna; jñåna can be called buddhi (1.1.15); buddhi is prameya (1.1.9). 
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2.1.17: pramåˆata˙ siddhe˙ pramåˆånåµ pramåˆåntarasiddhiprasa∫ga˙ 
 “Since the means of knowledge [must themselves] be known by virtue of 
means of knowledge, there is the undesired consequence that [in order to 
know a means of knowledge, each time] another means of knowledge is 
required.” 
2.1.18: tadviniv®tter vå pramåˆasiddhivat prameyasiddhi˙ 
 “Or, in case this [infinite regress] were to stop, the result would be that, 
like the means of knowledge, also the objects of knowledge would be 
known [without the help of a means of knowledge].” 
2.1.19: na prad¥paprakåßavat tatsiddhe˙ 
 “[This is] not [correct], since the means of knowledge are known after 
the manner of the light of a lamp.” 
 
The meaning of this set of sËtras, and of 2.1.19 in particular, is clear. Just as the light of 
a lamp illumines both itself and other things, so the means of knowledge bring about the 
knowledge of themselves and of other things. We shall study below why the traditional 
explanation of this sËtra took a different direction. 
[112] 
1.3. The arguments contained in sËtras 2.1.17-19 are repeated in Någårjuna’s 
Vigrahavyåvartan¥ vv. 31 f. I translate vv. 31-33, plus a portion of Någårjuna’s own 
commentary on v. 33 (pp. 128-30/30-32):5 
 
[31:] And if according to you all objects are known by virtue of means of 
knowledge, explain then how according to you those means of knowledge are 
known. 
[32:] If means of knowledge are known through other means of knowledge, then 
there is infinite regress (anavasthå). Neither the beginning nor the middle nor the 
end are in that case known. 
[33:] But if6 those [means of knowledge] are [themselves] known without the 
help of means of knowledge, then the initial position is abandoned. There will 
be inequality [in treatment], and a special reason must be given for this. 
                                                
5 yadi ca pramåˆatas te te∑åµ te∑åµ prasiddhir arthånåm | 
te∑åµ puna˙ prasiddhiµ brËhi kathaµ te pramåˆånåm || 31 || 
anyair yadi pramåˆai˙ pramåˆasiddhir bhavet tad anavasthå | 
nåde˙ siddhis tatråsti naiva madhyasya nåntasya || 32 || 
te∑åm atha pramåˆair vinå prasiddhir vih¥yate våda˙ | 
vai∑amikatvaµ tasmin viße∑ahetuß ca vaktavya˙ || 33 || 
[Comm.:] … atråha | pramåˆåny eva svåtmånam paråtmånaµ ca prasådhayanti | yathoktam — 
 dyotayati svåtmånaµ yathå hutåßas tathå paråtmånam | 
 svaparåtmånåv evaµ prasådhayanti pramåˆån¥ti || 
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[Comm.:] In this connection [the opponent] says: The same means of knowledge 
make known themselves and other things. As it has been said: 
Just as a fire brightens itself and something else, so the means of 
knowledge make known themselves and other things. 
 
The Vaidalyaprakaraˆa, which is likewise attributed to Någårjuna, has a similar passage 
on VaidalyasËtras 4-5 (p. 135, l. 11-23):7 
 
If it is assumed that without means of knowledge no object of knowledge is 
established, on what [basis] are the means of knowledge assumed to be 
established without means of knowledge? Is there a special reason? The 
inequality must be explained. 
 Even if you say that all objects are established with the help of means of 
knowledge, the undesired consequence would be the statement that means of 
knowledge are established with the help of means of knowledge other than they 
[themselves]; because the means of knowledge are included among all objects. 
 If means of knowledge are not established with the help of means of 
knowledge, then your assurance that all objects must be established with means 
of knowledge, is violated. 
[113] 
[The opponent] says: 
 [SËtra 5:] Means of knowledge have no means of knowledge (by which they are 
known). In this respect a means of knowledge is like a lamp: it establishes itself 
as well as other things. 
Just as a lamp is seen to light up itself as well as other things, so do also means 
of knowledge establish themselves as well as other things. 
 
The Vigrahavyåvartan¥ and Vaidalyaprakaraˆa refute at length the view of the 
opponent, which is the position adopted in the Nyåya sËtras, as we now know. 
                                                                                                                                         
6 ‘But if’ often gives the correct meaning of atha, as pointed out to me by Prof. T. E. Vetter long ago; see 
also Lindtner, 1982: 71 n. 111 (sin autem). 
7 gal te tshad ma med pas g∑al bya grub pa ma yin par ˙dod na ga∫ gis na tshad ma rnams med par tshad 
ma rnams grub par ˙dod pa yin te | khyad par gyi gtan tshigs sam mi ˙dra ba ñid brjod dgos so || gal te 
ya∫ don thams cad tshad mas grub par yin no ∑e na | tshad ma rnams de las g∑an pa˙i tshad mas grub bo 
∑es bya bar thal bar ˙gyur te | tshad ma rnams ni don thams cad kyi na∫ du gtogs pa˙i phyir ro || gal te 
tshad ma rnams ni tshad ma rnams kyis ˙grub pa ma yin na ni don thams cad tshad mas bsgrub par bya ba 
yin no | ∑es bya ba˙i dam bca˙ ñams pa yin no || 
smras pa | 
 [sËtra 5:] tshad ma rnams la ni tshad ma med do | ˙dir mar me b∑in tshad ma ni ra∫ da∫ g∑an sgrub 
par byed pa yin no | 




1.4. It is of some importance to note that the objection expressed in Nyåya sËtras 
2.1.8-11, and which had erroneously been attributed to a Mådhyamika, is not referred to 
in the Vigrahavyåvartan¥ and Vaidalyaprakaraˆa. It is true that the mutual dependency 
of object and means of knowledge is discussed in both these works, but the connection 
with the Nyåya sËtras is only apparent, not real. This will be clear from the following 
passages. Vigrahavyåvartan¥ vv. 40-51 (pp. 133-38/35-40) reads:8 
 
[40:] If in your opinion the means of knowledge are known by themselves, then 
they are known independently of the objects of knowledge; not is something 
known by itself dependently of something else. 
[41:] If in your opinion the means of knowledge are known independently of the 
objects of knowledge, then these same means of knowledge are not [means of 
knowledge] of something. 
[42:] But if you think that there is nothing wrong in supposing that those [means 
of knowledge] are known dependently [of their objects, I reply that in that case] 
you are establishing what was known already, for something unknown is not 
dependent on something else. 
[43:] For if the means of knowledge are in all cases established dependent upon 
the objects of knowledge, then the objects of knowledge cannot be established 
on the basis of the means of knowledge. 
                                                                                                                                         
ji ltar mar me ni ra∫ da∫ g∑an gsal bar byed pa mtho∫ ba de b∑in du tshad ma rnams kya∫ ra∫ da∫ g∑an 
sgrub par byed pa yin no || 
8 yadi svataß ca pramåˆasiddhir anapek∑ya tava prameyåni / 
bhavati pramåˆsiddhir na paråpek∑å svata˙ siddhi˙ // 40 // 
anapek∑ya hi prameyån arthån yadi te pramåˆasiddhir iti / 
na bhavanti kasyacid evam imåni tåni pramåˆåni // 41 // 
atha matam apek∑ya siddhis te∑åm ity atra bhavati ko do∑a˙ / 
siddhasya sådhanaµ syån nåsiddho ‘pek∑ate hy anyat // 42 // 
sidhyanti hi prameyåˆy apek∑ya yadi sarvathå pramåˆåni / 
bhavati prameyasiddhir nåpek∑yaiva pramåˆåni // 43 // 
yadi ca prameyasiddhir nåpek∑yaiva bhavati pramåˆåni / 
kiµ te pramåˆasiddhyå tåni yadarthaµ prasiddhaµ tat // 44 // 
atha tu pramåˆasiddhir bhavaty apek∑yaiva te prameyåˆi / 
vyatyaya evaµ sati te dhruvaµ pramåˆapremeyåˆåm // 45 // 
atha te pramåˆasiddhyå prameyasiddhi˙ prameyasiddhyå ca / 
bhavati pramåˆasiddhir nåsty ubhayasyåpi te siddhi˙ // 46 // 
sidhyanti hi pramåˆair yadi prameyåˆi tåni tair eva / 
sådhyåni ca prameyais tåni kathaµ sådhayi∑yanti // 47 // 
sidhyanti ca prameyair yadi pramåˆåni tåni tair eva / 
sådhyåni ca pramåˆais tåni kathaµ sådhayi∑yanti // 48 // 
pitrå yadi utpådya˙ putor yadi tena caiva putreˆa / 
utpådya˙ sa yadi pitå vada tatrotpådayati ka˙ kam // 49 // 
kaß ca pitå ka˙ putras tatra tvaµ brËhi tåv ubhåv api ca / 
pit®putralak∑aˆadharau yato bhavati no ‘tra saµdeha˙ // 50 // 
naiva svata˙ prasiddhir na parasparata˙ parapramåˆair vå / 
na bhavati na ca prameyair na cåpy akasmåt pramåˆånåm // 51 // 
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[44:] But if the objects of knowledge cannot be established on the basis of the 
means of knowledge, why then do you establish the means [114] knowledge? 
The reason for which you do so (viz., the objects of knowledge) has been 
established already. 
[45:] But if in your opinion the means of knowledge are established as 
dependent upon the objects of knowledge, there will certainly be an interchange 
of means and objects of knowledge (since the dependency ought to be the 
reverse). 
[46:] But if in your opinion the objects of knowledge are established by the 
establishment of the means of knowledge and vice versa, then neither are for 
you established. 
[47:] For if the objects of knowledge are established with the help of the means 
of knowledge, and those [means of knowledge] must be established with the 
help of those same objects of knowledge, how then will those [means of 
knowledge] establish [anything]? 
[48:] And if the means of knowledge are established with the help of the objects 
of knowledge, and those [objects of knowledge] must be established with the 
help of those same means of knowledge, how then will those [objects of 
knowledge] establish [anything] ? 
[49:] If the son must be begotten by the father, and if that father must be 
begotten by that same son, tell me, who begets whom in that case ? 
[50:] Tell who is the father in this case, who the son, since both have the 
characteristics of a father and of a son. We are in doubt. 
[51:] The means of knowledge are [as a result of all this] not known by 
themselves, by each other, or by other means of knowledge, nor also by the 
objects of knowledge or by accident. 
 
Also the Vaidalyaprakaraˆa gives an altogether different argument, even where it 
resembles the Nyåya sËtras closely, viz., in its discussion of the means and objects of 
knowledge in their relation to time on sËtra 11 (p. 137, l. 21-31):9 
 
                                                
9 [sËtra 11:] tshad ma da∫ g∑al bya dag ni dus gsum du ma grub po / tshad ma ni g∑al bya˙i don las s∫a 
rol du ˙am phyis sam / tshad ma da∫ g∑al bya dag cig car du yod gra∫ / de la gal te tshad ma g∑al bya˙i 
don las s∫a rol du yin na ni ga∫ gi na de tshad mar brjod par bya ba g∑al bya˙i don yod pa ma yin na ga∫ 
gi tshad ma yin ∑i∫ ci ∑ig tshad mas ∫es par byed / ˙on te phyis nas yin na g∑al bya yod pa la ci ∑ig tshad 
mar ˙gyur / ma skyes pa ni skyes pa˙i tshad mar ˙thad pa ma yin te / ri bo∫ gi rva sogs pa ya∫ tshad ma 
ñid du thal bar ˙gyur ba˙i phyir da∫ / ma skyes pa da∫ skyes pa dag lhan cig mi gnas pa˙i phyir ro // ˙on 
te cig car ba yin na de ya∫ srid pa ma yin te / dper na ba la∫ gi rva cig car skyes pa dag rgyu da∫ ˙bras bur 
mi ˙thad pa b∑in no // 
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[SËtra 11:] The means of knowledge and the object of knowledge are not 
established in the three times. 
 
Is the means of knowledge earlier or later than the object to be known? Or 
perhaps means and object of knowledge exist simultaneously. Among these 
[possibilities,] [1.] if the means of knowledge is earlier than the object to be 
known, with respect [115] to what has it been called ‘means of knowledge’? 
When the object to be known does not exist, of what is it then means of 
knowledge? What is certified with [such a] means of knowledge? [2.] If, on the 
other hand, it is later, what then becomes a means of knowledge, given the fact 
that the objects of knowledge exist already? What has not come into existence 
cannot be a means of knowledge of what has come into existence, because 
[then] also a hare’s horn etc. would become a means of knowledge, and because 
what has not come into existence and what has come into existence do not occur 
together. [3.] Moreover, it is also not possible that they are simultaneous. For 
example, the two horns of a bull that have come into existence simultaneously 
cannot be cause and effect. 
 
We know now that it would be wrong to interpret Nyåya sËtras 2.1.8-11 in the light of 
Någårjuna’s arguments, in spite of the similarity. It becomes however understandable 
that later authors made this mistake. 
 
1.5. We see that there is good reason to think that the Vigrahavyåvartan¥ and 
Vaidalyaprakaraˆa were later than Nyåya sËtras 2.1.8-19. Oberhammer (1963: 68-69) 
has pointed out that Vigrahavyåvartan¥ v. 69 with commentary shows acquaintance with 
Nyåya sËtras 5.1.18-20. The Vaidalyaprakaraˆa quotes and refers to numerous Nyåya 
sËtras; see Lindtner, 1982: 87; Williams, 1978: 287f. The conclusion which presents 
itself is that Någårjuna knew the whole of the Nyåya SËtra. We shall see below that this 
conclusion must be modified to some extent. 
 
2.1. Någårjuna’s attack on the means of knowledge did not remain unnoticed. 
Pak∑ilasvåmin, alias Våtsyåyana, the author of the Nyåya Bhå∑ya, was acquainted with 
it and remedied it in a twofold manner. On the one hand he reinterpreted a number of 
the sËtras concerned in such a manner that they now seemed to answer the objections 
raised by Någårjuna. On the other hand he wrote in a passage of the Bhå∑ya a very 
competent reply to Någårjuna’s arguments. 
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 SËtras 2.1.8-11 originally raised an objection which drew its inspiration from the 
Sarvåstivådins; this we know. In Pak∑ilasvåmin’s interpretation they do something 
different altogether. Here they embody the criticism [116] contained in Någårjuna’s 
Vigrahavyåvartan¥ vv. 40-51 and Vaidalyaprakaraˆa on sËtra 11. This becomes clear in 
Pak∑ilasvåmin’s commentary on sËtra 2.1.10. This sËtra originally raised the point that 
if a mental act would exist before the mental act whose object it is, it would be known 
without this latter mental act, i.e., without a means of knowledge. In Pak∑ilasvåmin’s 
paraphrase however it means: “When the means of knowledge is not present, by which 
[means] would the object be known and be object of knowledge? Only with the help of 
a means of knowledge can an object be known and recognized as ‘object of 
knowledge’.” (p. 92: asati pramåˆe pram¥yamåˆo ’rtha˙ kena prameya˙ syå / 
pramåˆena khalu pram¥yamåˆo ’rtha˙ prameyam ity etat sidhyati /) This is a more or 
less satisfactory restatement of Vigrahavyåvartan¥ v. 43 and Vaidalyaprakaraˆa on sËtra 
11 possibility 2, but has nothing to do with the original meaning of the sËtra, as we 
know. 
 Pak∑ilasvåmin’s explanation of sËtra 2.1.11 is not very satisfying, and this can 
scarcely surprise us in view of the fact that this sËtra expresses most clearly the original 
intention of its author. Far more interesting is a portion of the remainder of the Bhå∑ya 
on this sËtra. We find here Pak∑ilasvåmin’s direct answer to Någårjuna, which brings 
clearly to light the weaknesses in the latter’s arguments. It focuses on Någårjuna’s 
criticism of the means of knowledge (pramåˆa) and object of knowledge (prameya), but 
could with minor adjustments be used to counter many of Någårjuna’s arguments. It 
reads (p. 94):10 
 
A designation is such and such because the reason underlying that designation is 
connected with [any one of] the three times.11 Regarding what has been said in 
connection with sËtra 2.1.10 — viz. that when the means of knowledge is not 
present an object of knowledge cannot exist [since only] an object known with 
                                                
10 samåkhyåhetos traikålyayogåt tathåbhËtå samåkhyå / yat punar idaµ paßcåt siddhåv asati pramåˆe 
prameyaµ na sidhyati pramåˆena pram¥yamåno ‘rtha˙ prameyam iti vijñåyata iti / pramåˆam ity etasyå˙ 
samåkhyåyå upalabdhihetutvaµ nimittam / tasya traikålyayoga upalabdhim akår∑¥d upalabdhiµ karoti 
upalabdhiµ kari∑yat¥ti / samåkhyåhetos traikålyayogåt samåkhyå tathåbhËtå / pramito ‘nenårtha˙ 
pram¥yate pramåsyata iti pramåˆam / pramitaµ pram¥yate pramåsyata iti ca prameyam / evaµ sati 
bhavi∑yaty asmin hetuta upalabdhi˙ / pramåsyate ‘yam artha˙ prameyam idam ity etat sarvaµ bhavat¥ti / 
traikålyånabhyanujñåne ca vyavahårånupapatti˙ / yaß caivaµ nåbhyanujån¥yåt tasya påcakam ånaya 
pak∑yati låvakam ånaya lavi∑yat¥ti vyavahåro nopapadyata iti / 
11 This sentence is sometimes looked upon as a sËtra; see Jhå, 1939: 121 n. It must certainly be looked 
upon as a brief statement which is then elaborated in what follows; the same sentence is as a matter of 
fact repeated in an only slightly different order a few lines later. We witness here another instance of the 
‘Vårttikastyle’ which was current in India during several centuries of the first millenium A.D.; see below 
§ 2.4. 
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the help of a means of knowledge is conceived of as an ‘object of knowledge’ 
— [we reply:] The condition underlying the designation ‘means of knowledge 
(pramåˆa)’ is the circumstance that it brings about awareness. That condition is 
connected with [any one of] the three times, so that it has brought about 
awareness, brings about awareness, or will bring about awareness. The 
designation is such and such because the reason underlying that designation is 
connected with [any one of] the three times. A means of knowledge (pramåˆa) 
[is called such] because an [117] object has been known (pramita) by it, is 
known (pram¥yate) or will be known (pramåsyate) [by it]. And an object of 
knowledge (prameya) [is called such] because it has been known (pramita), is 
known (pram¥yate) or will be known (pramåsyate). Such being the case, all this 
is [correct] that [we say] ‘this is an object of knowledge’ [because] awareness of 
it will occur on the basis of a [good] reason, [or because] this object will be 
known. And if [the connection of the designation with] the three times is not 
accepted, ordinary usage will not be possible. For him who does not accept this, 
ordinary usages like ‘bring the cook, he will do the cooking’, and ‘bring the 
cutter, he will do the cutting’ will not be possible. 
 
Pak∑ilasvåmin also answers Någårjuna’s criticism of Nyåya sËtra 2.1.19, according to 
which the means of knowledge make known both themselves and their objects, like the 
light of a lamp. Here again he reinterprets the sËtra, in such a way that it agrees with his 
interpretation of sËtra 2.1.16 which he connects with the same problem.12 In 
Pak∑ilasvåmin’s interpretation sËtra 16 states that a means of knowledge can at the 
same time be an object of knowledge. SËtra 19 is then made to convey this same sense, 
it being understood (and made explicit in the Bhå∑ya) that one means of knowledge is 
the object of another means of knowledge. Någårjuna’s criticism is in this way passed 
by, but only incompletely. In point of fact, the remark ‘by each other’ (parasparata˙) in 
Vigrahavyåvartan¥ v. 51 was directed precisely against the interpretation of sËtras 
2.1.16 and 19 that Pak∑ilasvåmin would give them. 
 
2.2. Pak∑ilasvåmin’s refutation of Någårjuna was not new. His main point, viz., that 
the designation of a thing may be occasioned by what it has done or will do in addition 
to what it does at present, is expressed in Nyåya sËtra 4.1.16, in a section (4.1.14-18) 
which seems clearly directed against the Mådhyamikas. We read: 
                                                
12 This is not the only time that Pak∑ilasvåmin disturbs the original and normal order (objection: 
refutation of objection) by reinterpreting the sËtras. The same appears to have happened in the case of 
sËtras 4.1.19-21; see Ingalls, 1957. 




4.1.14: abhåvåd bhåvotpattir nånupam®dya prådurbhåvåt 
 “Existing things arise from non-existence, since [nothing] appears 
without destroying [its cause].” 
[118] 
4.1.15: vyåghåtåd aprayoga˙ 
 “[Obj.:] This is not correctly said, because it is self-contradictory.” 
4.1.16: nåt¥tånågatayo˙ kårakaßabdaprayogåt 
 “No, for words expressive of things engaged in activities are used [also] 
with reference to the past and the future.” 
4.1.17: na vina∑†ebhyo ‘ni∑patte˙ 
 “[Obj.:] [This is] not [correct], since there can be no origination from 
destroyed things.” 
4.1.18: kramanirdeßåd aprati∑edha˙ 
 “This rejection is not valid, since we teach a sequence [of cause and 
effect].” 
 
It seems impossible to deny the connection of these sËtras with the famous arguments in 
which Någårjuna ‘proved’ that nothing can ever be produced. I give a few verses from 
the MËlamadhyamakakårikå in order to show this:13 
 
7.17: If there were a non-arisen thing anywhere, it might arise; since such a 
thing does not exist, what arises? 
… 
8.1: An existing agent (kåraka) does not produce an existing object; nor does a 
non-existing agent aim at a non-existing object. 
8.2: When [the object] exists, there is no making [any more] of it, and the object 
would be without maker. When [the maker] exists, there is no making [any 
more] by him, and the maker would be without object. 
8.3: If a non-existent agent produces a non-existent object, the object would 
exist without ground, and the maker would exist without ground. 
                                                
13 yadi kaßcid anutpanno bhåva˙ saµvidyate kva cit / 
utpadyeta sa kiµ tasmin bhåva utpadate ‘sati // 7.17 // 
… 
sadbhËta˙ kåraka˙ karma sadbhËtaµ na karoty ayam / 
kårako nåpy asadbhËta˙ karmåsadbhËtam ¥hate // 8.1 // 
sadbhËtasya kriyå nåsti karma ca syåd akart®kam / 
sadbhËtasya kriyå nåsti kartå ca syåd akarmaka˙ // 8.2 // 
karoti yady asadbhËto ‘sadbhËtaµ karma kåraka˙ / 
ahetukaµ bhavet karma kartå cåhetuko bhavet // 8.3 // 




There is another discussion with Mådhyamikas in Nyåya sËtras 4.1.34-37: 
 
4.1.34: sarvam abhåvo bhåve∑v itaretaråbhåvasiddhe˙ 
 “[Obj.:] Everything is non-existence, since in all things the non-existence 
of the other thing is established.” 
4.1.35: na svabhåvasiddher bhåvånåm 
 “No, because the own nature (svabhåva) of things (bhåva) is 
established.” 
4.1.36: na svabhåvasiddhir åpek∑ikatvåt 
 “[Obj.:] The own nature is not established, since it depends [on other 
things].” 
4.1.37: vyåhatatvåd ayuktam 
 “This is not proper, since it is self-contradictory.” 
 
Dependence on something else is an important argument in Någårjuna’s works to show 
that no own nature of things can exist. We find it, for example, in 
MËlamadhyamakakårikå 10.10-11:14 
 
10.10: The thing which is established depending [on something else], if that on 
which it depends is established as depending thereon, let it then be established 
what depends on what. 
10.11: The thing which is established depending [on something else], how can it 
depend [on something] without being established? But if something established 
depends [on something else], its dependence is not proper. 
 
2.3. The relationship between Nyåya sËtras 4.1.14-18 and 34-37 on the one hand, and 
Någårjuna’s works on the other, raises new questions regarding the chronology of the 
Nyåya sËtras. Some of them are undoubtedly older than Någårjuna, others are younger. 
Where should we draw the dividing line? 
[120] 
 A solution can be arrived at on the basis of a survey of the topics discussed in the 
Nyåya sËtras. The very first sËtra enumerates the categories whose knowledge leads to 
release (1.1.1). These categories are further briefly specified in sËtras 1.1.3-1.2.20. 
                                                
14 yo ‘pek∑ya sidhyate bhåvas tam evåpek∑ya sidhyati / 
yadi yo ‘pek∑itavya˙ sa sidhyatåµ kam apek∑ya ka˙ // 10 // 
yo ‘pek∑ya sidhyate bhåva˙ so ‘siddho ‘pek∑ate katham / 
NÓGÓRJUNA AND THE NAIYÓYIKAS        14 
 
 
Subsequently the most important categories are discussed in full detail: doubt (saµßaya: 
2.1.1-7), means of knowledge (pramåˆa: 2.1.8-2.67), objects of knowledge (prameya: 
3.1.1-4.1.64), false objections (jåti:15 5.1.1-38), positions of defeat (nigrahasthåna: 
5.2.1-24). The means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge are dealt with in 
accordance with the classifications given initially (2.1.20-66 and 3.1.1-4.1.64). It is 
clearly visible that the structure of the work as a whole was well thought out, and this 
supports that it is a unitary creation. However, the structure of the work is disrupted at a 
few places. One of them is 4.1.11-40, which deals with the rejection of some wrong 
opinions that hardly fit the context: sËtra 4.1.10 concerns existence after death 
(pretyabhåva), and sËtra 4.1.41 continues with a discussion of the results (phala) of 
action; ‘existence after death’ and ‘result of action’ are two consecutive objects of 
knowledge enumerated in sËtra 1.1.9. 
 We see that our two sets of sËtras 4.1.14-18 and 34-37 have the appearance of 
being part of a later insertion into the text of the Nyåya SËtra. In itself there is nothing 
unlikely in such an assumption. Någårjuna’s attacks had been directed against some of 
the Nyåya sËtras, and an answer was due. The question which remains is: who added 
these sËtras? 
 
2.4. There are several reasons to suspect Pak∑ilasvåmin, the author of the Nyåya 
Bhå∑ya. One reason, admittedly only a minor one, is that the response to Någårjuna in 
sËtra 4.1.16 is exactly the one given by Pak∑ilasvåmin on sËtra 2.1.11 in a passage 
which we studied in § 2.1 above. This reason is only minor because it is conceivable 
that Pak∑ilasvåmin derived his response from those sËtras, in which case those sËtras 
would antedate him. 
 But our suspicion of Pak∑ilasvåmin is supported by the consideration that the 
author of a Bhå∑ya — usually the first and major commentary on a SËtra text; see 
however below — is more than anyone before or after him in a position to determine 
the final shape of the SËtra text. There is also reason to think that bhå∑yakåras 
sometimes did not shy away from using these powers. It seems that the Yoga sËtras 
were collected together by the author of the Yoga Bhå∑ya (Bronkhorst, 1984: § 1). It is 
not impossible that Pak∑ilasvåmin did the same thing, if on a more limited scale. 
[121] 
 We may not have to go to this extent in order to explain the presence of added 
sËtras in the Nyåya SËtra. Another explanation may lie in the style of the Nyåya 
Bhå∑ya. Like certain other works of the same period, parts of the Nyåya Bhå∑ya are 
                                                                                                                                         
athåpy apek∑ate siddhas tv apek∑åsya na yujyate // 11 // 
15 The word jåti does not occur in this section; it does occur in the Bhå∑ya introducing it. 
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written in the ‘Vårttika-style’, a style in which short nominal sentences alternate with 
more elaborate explanations of the former (see Windisch, 1888: 15 f.). This style cannot 
always be explained by the assumption that two authors produced the text — one the 
nominal sentences (vårttika/våkya), the other their explanations — as was the case in 
Patañjali’s Mahåbhå∑ya, which contains Kåtyåyana’s vårttikas. Rather, the ‘Vårttika-
style’ evolved as an imitation of the style of the Mahåbhå∑ya in a time when the double 
authorship of this work was no longer known (Bronkhorst, 1990). 
 It goes without saying that the ‘Vårttika-style’ enabled Pak∑ilasvåmin to discuss 
material in his Bhå∑ya that had not been mentioned in the sËtras, in a manner scarcely 
distinguishable from what had found expression therein. The homogeneousness of 
treatment was enhanced by another peculiarity of Bhå∑yas — it is demonstrably present 
in the Yoga Bhå∑ya and in the Jaina Tattvårthådhigama Bhå∑ya; see Bronkhorst, 1985: 
§ 4.2 —, viz., to treat the combination sËtras + Bhå∑ya as a unitary whole. The result 
would inevitably be that later readers found it hard to distinguish between sËtras and 
vårttikas. And this is indeed what happened frequently in the Nyåya Bhå∑ya.16 It was 
almost inevitable that where Pak∑ilasvåmin deemed it necessary to add discussions of 
his own, the vårttikas therein would come to be looked upon as sËtras. 
 All this shows that it is very well possible that sËtras 4.1.11-40 derive from the 
Nyåya Bhå∑ya. A reason to think that this is what actually happened is the following. It 
is hard to understand why sËtras 4.1.11-40 should follow the one sËtra (4.1.10) which 
deals with existence after death (pretyabhåva): “Since the soul is eternal, existence after 
death is established” (åtmanityatve pretyabhåvasiddhi˙). SËtras 4.1.11-24 deal with 
origination (utpatti) of material objects. The connection is made in the Bhå∑ya which 
cites sËtra 1.1.19 (punarutpatti˙ pretyabhåva˙) and remarks that it is wrong to think that 
existence after death implies the origination (utpåda) of one being (sattva) and the 
destruction of another. This is then reason to continue (p. 286): “If [you ask] how 
origination takes place …” (katham utpattir ici cet …).17 
 However, there is one important reason to doubt that Pak∑ilasvåmin [122] 
composed sËtras 4.1.14-18. It appears that the Nyåya Bhå∑ya does not interpret these 
                                                
16 Regarding the authenticity of individual sËtras and the question if they are not really part of the 
Bhå∑ya, see Ruben, 1928: 6, 168-69 n. 43 (on 1.1.13), 16 (1.2.11), 25, 186 n. 117 (2.1.19a), 27 (2.1.25), 
28, 187 n. 121 (2.1.27a and b), 29, 187 n. 122 (2.1.30), 35 8 2.1.50a), 43 (2.2.12a), 45 (2.2.20), 47 
(2.2.28), 49, 193 n. 160 (2.2.36a), 50 (2.2.41a), 52 (2.2.47; 2.2.47a and b), 55 (2.2.57), 60 (3.1.14a), 61 
(3.1.16a and b), 64 (3.1.26a, b and c), 67 (3.1.33a, b and c), 70-71 (3.1.47a, b and c), 71 (3.1.49), 73 
(3.1.60), 75 (3.1.66), 78 (3.2.9a; 3.2.10a; 3.2.11), 86 (3.2.33a; 3.2.36a), 89 (3.2.42a; 3.2.43a and b), 93, 
125-26 (3.2.59), 94 (3.2.63), 95 (3.2.66a), 96 (3.2.67a; 3.2.70), 104 (4.1.28), 105 (4.1.29a, b and c), 108 
(4.1.41a), 113 (4.1.56a), 117 (4.2.7), 118 (4.2.8), 126 (4.2.41), 150 (5.2.14a). 
17 Also Jhå (1939: 415 n.) is of the opinion that the only possible connection lies in the remarks of the 
Bhå∑ya. He does not draw the unavoidable conclusion that then Pak∑ilasvåmin must be responsible for 
the position, and perhaps also the form, of sËtras 4.1.11 f. 
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sËtras as originally intended.18 This original intention is to all appearances as expressed 
in the translation above (§ 2.2). Here existing things are said to arise from non-
existence, in the sense that the causes of a thing do not exist simultaneously with it, but 
in immediate sequence with it. Pak∑ilasvåmin does not seem to feel at ease with this 
interpretation. He introduces sËtra 4.1.14 as giving the view of an opponent 
(pråvåduka). He then explains sËtras 14-17 in such a manner that it is not clear to which 
party they belong; but his explanation of 4.1.18 seems to reject, or at any rate modify, 
the position of sËtra 14. It reads (pp. 289-90):19 
 
[SËtra 4.1.18:] There is no rejection, since we teach that there must be a 
sequence. 
 
Sequence (krama) is the fixed succession of destruction and arising. That 
[sequence] is taught to be the cause of the arising of an existent thing from non-
existence. And that is not rejected. A substance arises not from non-existence, 
[but] from a new arrangement of parts whose arrangement has been disturbed, 
when their earlier arrangement has come to an end. The parts of a seed come for 
whatever reason into action, abandon their earlier arrangement and acquire 
another one; from this other arrangement the shoot arises. The causes of the 
arising of a shoot are, as a matter of fact, seen to be its parts and their 
connections. It is not possible that the parts of a seed adopt another arrangement 
as long as the earlier arrangement has not come to an end; for this reason there is 
a fixed succession of destruction and arising, [which is called] ‘sequence’ 
(krama). Consequently existing things do not arise from non-existence. 
Moreover, there is no other cause for the arising of a shoot than [just] the parts 
of the seed, and therefore the necessary connection with a seed as material cause 
is fitting. 
 
Pak∑ilasvåmin’s appears to be a qualified agreement with the original intention of these 
sËtras. This means that if these sËtras were originally vårttikas of his Bhå∑ya, at least 
some of his vårttikas were borrowed from somewhere else. 
                                                
18 See Ruben, 1928: 211 n. 248-49. 
19 [SËtra 4.1.18:] kramanirdeßåd aprati∑edha˙ // 
[Bh.:] upamardaprådurbhåvayo˙ paurvåparyaniyama˙ krama˙ / sa khalv abhåvåd bhåvotpatter hetur 
nirdißyate / sa ca na prati∑idhyata iti / vyåhatavyËhånåm avayavånåµ pËrvavyËhaniv®ttau vyËhåntaråd 
dravyani∑pattir nåbhåvåt / b¥jåvayavå˙ kutaßcin nimittåt prådurbhËtakriyå˙ pËrvavyËhaµ jahati 
vyËhåntaraµ cåpadyante vyËhåntaråd a∫kura utpadyate / d®ßyante khalv avayavås tatsaµyogåß 
cå∫kurotpattihetava˙ / na cåniv®tte pËrvavyËhe b¥jåvayavånåµ ßakyaµ vyËhåntareˆa bhavitum ity 
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 In itself this cannot be considered an impossibility. As a matter of fact, [123] 
earlier authors had come to the opinion that during the time between the original Nyåya 
SËtra and the Nyåya Bhå∑ya sËtra-like statements were composed (Ruben, 1928: 88, 
150, 215 n. 274, 219-20 n. 299) and that at least some of the vårttikas in the Bhå∑ya 
existed prior to the Bhå∑ya (Randle, 1930: 18-24). Indeed, it is possible that an earlier 
commentary on the Nyåya SËtra existed (Wezler, 1969a: 200 f.; 1969b: 839 f.) of which 
some or all of these earlier vårttikas were part. 
 
3.1. We see that the relationship between the Nyåya sËtras and Någårjuna is 
satisfactorily explained by assuming that the Nyåya SËtra is a unitary whole apart from 
the sections which do not organically fit. It is true that it is not easy to answer the 
question who added the later sections — Pak∑ilasvåmin is a likely candidate, but no 
more than that; this does not however affect the main point. 
 It is time to pay attention to the suggestion made by Tucci (1929: xxvii) according 
to which books II-IV of the Nyåya SËtra existed separately as a part of a Vaiße∑ika 
treatise before it was incorporated into the former. This suggestion was readily accepted 
by Oberhammer (1963: 70) who likes to see in books I and V an originally separate 
work on våda. Which is the evidence on which this suggestion is based? 
 Óryadeva’s Íataßåstra20 quotes four sËtra from Nyåya SËtra book III.21 The 
commentator Vasu ascribes these sËtras to “the disciples of UlËka, who recite the 
Vaiße∑ika SËtra”.22 The Íataßåstra, together with Vasu’s commentary, was translated 
into Chinese by Kumåraj¥va in 404 A.D. During the time of Vasu, which must have 
been the fourth century at the latest, these Nyåya sËtras were still part of a Vaiße∑ika 
treatise; so the argument runs. 
 I think this argument is without value. I have maintained elsewhere (1981) that 
the so-called ‘Yoga system of philosophy’ arose because someone who adhered to the 
Såµkhya philosophy wrote a handbook of Yoga practice which happened to become 
influential. It seems that the so-called ‘Nyåya system of philosophy’ arose because 
someone who adhered to the Vaiße∑ika philosophy wrote a handbook on rules of debate. 
                                                                                                                                         
upamardaprådurbhåvayo˙ paurvåparyaniyama˙ krama˙ / tasmån nåbhåvåd bhåvotpattir iti / na cånyad 
b¥jåvayavebhyo ‘∫kurotpattikåraˆam ity upapadyate b¥jopådånaniyama iti // 
20 T. 1569. An English translation of this work can be found in Tucci, 1929. On the correctness or 
otherwise of the title of the work, see Gard, 1954: 751 f. 
21 T. 1569 p. 172c19 = NS 3.1.12; 
T. 1569 p. 172c21 = NS 3.1.1; 
T. 1569 p. 173a14 = NS 3.1.17; 
T. 1569 p. 173a27-28 = NS 3.1.7. 
22 T. 1569 p. 171b7-8. Note that this ascription is not fully beyond doubt, since the discussion shifts from 
Vaiße∑ikas to Såµkhyas and then presumably back to Vaiße∑ikas, this last shift being made without 
indication to that effect. See Tucci, 1929: Notes on ÍÍ: 50 (“Here the author refutes again the Vaiße∑ika 
(Nyåya) point of view”). 
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In both cases expositions of already existing systems of philosophy (Såµkhya and 
Vaiße∑ika respectively) in specific contexts (Yoga and rules of debate) came to be 
mistaken for basic works on separate systems of philosophy (‘Yoga’ and ‘Nyåya’). This 
means that the Nyåya sËtras, and more in particular those among them which do [124] 
not directly deal with rules of debate, could justifiably be called ‘Vaiße∑ika sËtras’. 
 To this must be added that there is reason to doubt that the term ‘Nyåya’ was in 
use from the beginning. It occurs nowhere in the Nyåya sËtras. Moreover, the older 
term for rules of debate and reasoning appears to have been ‘Ónv¥k∑ik¥’ (cf. Hacker, 
1958). The word ‘Nyåya’ was originally associated with PËrvam¥måµså rather than 
with ‘our’ Nyåya (Winternitz, 1920: 423). Pak∑ilasvåmin calls the followers of Nyåya-
Vaiße∑ika ‘Yogas’ (p. 49, on 1.1.29; cf. Bronkhorst, 1981: 310). And the one time he 
mentions ‘Naiyåyikas’ (p. 51, on 1.1.32), he may have Såµkhyas in mind (Sadhu Ram, 
1958; 15-18). According to Tucci (1929: xxviii; cf. Ui, 1917: 55-56 n. 3) and Lindtner 
(1982: 250 n. 194) the early Naiyåyikas were sometimes called ‘Naya-sauma’. 
 
3.2. We turn finally to a passage of the Nyåya SËtra which has been claimed to argue 
with the Mådhyamikas. It occurs in Nyåya SËtra 4.2, which deals with knowledge, a 
subject that does not easily fit at that place. The passage to be considered is therefore of 
suspected authenticity. A closer inspection reveals that its connection with 
Madhyamaka is not proven. 
 Nyåya sËtra 4.2.26 embodies an objection that is answered in sËtras 27-30. The 
whole set reads: 
 
4.2.26: buddhyå vivecanåt tu bhåvånåµ yåthåtmyånupalabdhis tantvapakar∑aˆe 
pa†asadbhåvånupalabdhivat tadanupalabdhi˙ 
 “But the real nature of things is not known by analyzing them mentally. 
It is not known, just as the existence of a cloth apart from the 
[constituting] threads is not known.” 
4.2.27: vyåhatatvåd ahetu˙ 
 “This is no reason [to think so] since it contradicts [experience (?)] 
4.2.28: tadåßrayatvåd ap®thaggrahaˆam 
 “Because [the properties] depend [for their existence] on that [real 
nature], it is not separately perceived.” 
[125] 
4.2.29: pramåˆataß cårthapratipatte˙ 
 “And [your opinion is incorrect] because things are known with the help 
of means of knowledge.” 




 “Because means of knowledge are either impossible (in which case your 
argument becomes worthless) or possible (in which case they must be 
agreed to make know the real nature of things).” 
 
The subject-matter of these sËtras is something which is not separately perceived (28) 
but apparently only in combination with things that depend on it, and which is known 
with the help of means of knowledge (29). These sËtras do not, therefore, deal with the 
atoms which had been discussed immediately before them. The mention of the validity 
or otherwise of the means of knowledge reminds us of sËtras 2.1.8 f., where this same 
topic had been dealt with in a confrontation with Sarvåstivåda ideas, as we have seen. 
The question presents itself if perhaps here again the objection can be understood 
against the background of Sarvåstivåda beliefs. 
 This is indeed possible. The Sarvåstivådins, and other Buddhists with them, 
rejected the belief in a soul (åtman, pudgala). This idea applied originally no doubt to 
living beings alone, but was soon extended, so that everything came to be considered 
‘soul-less’ (anåtmaka) and empty (ßËnya). We find this doctrine for example in the 
Abhidharmah®daya (or Abhidharmasåra) of Dharmaßr¥ (or Dharmaßre∑†hin),23 a work 
which may antedate Någårjuna. A passage from the Milindapañha,24 in which 
‘soullessness’ is demonstrated by showing that there is no chariot apart from its parts, 
indicates that the denial of a whole as different from its parts was intimately related 
with the emptiness of things. The Naiyåyikas, on the other hand, accepted the existence 
of wholes (see e.g. Nyåya sËtra 2.1.30 etc.), and this was additional reason to defend the 
view that the ‘real nature’ (yåthåtmya) of things can be known. 
 Nyåya sËtras 4.2.31-32 are answered in sËtras 33-34. They read: 
 
4.2.31: svapnavi∑ayåbhimånavad ayaµ pramåˆaprameyåbhimåna˙ 
 “This erroneous conception of means of knowledge and objects of 
knowledge is similar to the erroneous conception of things in a dream.” 
[126] 
4.2.32: måyågandharvanagaram®gat®∑ˆikåvad vå 
 “Or it is like magic, like a city of Gandharvas, like a mirage.” 
                                                
23 T. 1550 p. 818a24-b2. The Abhidharmah®daya has been translated by Willemen (1975) and Armelin 
(1978). 
24 II.1.1. Translated in Frauwallner, 1956: 66 f. 
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4.2.33: hetvabhåvåd asiddhi˙ 
 “[Your objection] is without proof, since there is no reason [to think as 
you do].” 
4.2.34: sm®tisaµkalpavac ca svapnavi∑ayåbhimåna˙ 
 “Moreover, the erroneous conception of things in a dream is like in a 
memory or resolution.” 
 
At first sight the objection of sËtras 31-32 seems to derive from Någårjuna’s 
MËlamadhyamakakårikå 23.8. There the objects of the senses — i.e., colour, sound, 
taste, touch, smell and dharma (the object of mind) — are compared to a city of 
Gandharvas, to a mirage (mar¥ci) and to a dream. 
 However, dream and the like are old and obvious indications that our perception 
may sometimes be wrong.25 Moreover, the answer of sËtra 4.2.33 shows that 
Någårjuna’s MËlamadhyamakakårikå cannot be the source of this objection. Contrary to 
what this sËtra states, Någårjuna gives plenty of reasons to think that the objects of the 
senses are like dreams etc. 
 Nyåya sËtras 4.2.26 f. are a continuation of sËtras 4.2.1-25, which primarily 
establish the existence of wholes (avayavin) over and above the parts (avayava). Here 
there is no need whatever to think the opponent is a Mådhyamika; most of the earlier 
Buddhist Óbhidharmikas, among them the Sarvåstivådins, held the opposite view that 
wholes do not exist. 
 
4. The main conclusion of this investigation is simple. The Nyåya SËtra existed 
before Någårjuna and was known to him. The terms used in this conclusion must 
however be specified to some extent. ‘Någårjuna’ here is the author of the 
Vigrahavyåvartan¥ and the Vaidalyaprakaraˆa, who, if he be different from the author 
of the MËlamadhyamakakårikå at all, was certainly not far removed from him in time. 
The Nyåya SËtra known to Någårjuna appears to have been identical with the one 
known to us, except for at least one portion which anyhow does not fit organically. 
Only in [127] this added portion do we find that Någårjuna’s type of arguments is 
answered. The absence of such an answer in the remainder of the Nyåya SËtra — a 
work on rules of debate! — shows that the original Nyåya SËtra was not acquainted 
with the MËlamadhyamakakårikå, nor with the type of reasoning used therein. 
                                                
25 See e.g. Maitråyaˆ¥ Upani∑ad 4.2, where a dream (svapna) is characterized as ‘faulty vision’ 
(mithyådarßana). The term gandharvanagara does not occur in the Buddhist Ógamas, as is confirmed in 
the Mahåprajñåpåramitåßåstra ascribed to Någårjuna (Lamotte, 1944: 370). Perhaps Någårjuna used this 
word under the influence of Nyåya sËtra 4.2.32. Note however that the term seems to have been used in 
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 Another result of our study is the ascertainment of the influence of Sarvåstivåda 
on the Nyåya sËtras. Nyåya took from Sarvåstivåda at least two important doctrines, 
viz., the existence of the three times — past, present and future —, and the non-
occurrence of more than one mental act at a time in one person. The Sarvåstivådins 
were apparently for the author(s) of the Nyåya sËtras a school whose ideas still formed 
a source of inspiration, both positively and negatively. 
 Pak∑ilasvåmin, the author of the Nyåya Bhå∑ya, was well acquainted with the 
works of Någårjuna, whereas the Sarvåstivådins were no longer of much consequence 
to him. As a result he reinterpreted sËtras which really dealt with the latter in such a 
way that they seemed to deal with the Mådhyamikas. He did this so skillfully that 
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